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4.1  Introduction 
It is safe to say that over the past 10 years, the Asia-West  Pacific area has 
had the most active and fastest growing economy in the world. It is a site of 
great ferment. The Asia-West  Pacific area encompasses a wide variety of re- 
gions, starting in the south with Oceania and extending across South Asia, the 
ASEAN countries, the NIEs, China and other transitional economies of Asia 
(TEA), and Japan. By comparison, the European Union is relatively compact, 
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), though it may extend far- 
ther south in the future, does not yet have the same geographic scope. 
According to the Nomura Research Institute (1989), in 1987 the combined 
GNP of all West Pacific economies (excluding South Asia) was nearly $6.34 
trillion. This figure is comparable to those for the European Community (with 
a GNP of $6.04 trillion) and North America (with a GNP  of $7.17 trillion). 
Further, it is expected that recent appreciation of the currencies of some West 
Pacific countries has increased the relative economic sizes of these countries. 
Thus, the regional economies of the West Pacific, Europe, and North America 
are similar in size. 
In terms of  growth rate the Asian performance has been remarkable. Table 
4.1 shows the growth rate of GDP for developing member countries (DMCs) 
of the Asian Development Bank. On average, these Asian and Pacific econo- 
mies grew almost 8 percent through the 1980s. In particular, China achieved 
double-digit growth in the 1980s, and its growth rate for recent years has ex- 
ceeded 13 percent. Growth rates for the NIEs and ASEAN countries were also 
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high. By contrast, in the past several years, the Philippines recorded relatively 
low growth rates, but it is reported to have  experienced remarkable growth 
in 1994. 
Though similar in their growth experience, the Asia-West  Pacific countries 
show great diversity in ethnicity, religion, political systems, history, and eco- 
nomic mechanisms. The diversity is well illustrated in the case of  religion. 
Christianity is prevalent in Australia, New  Zealand, and the Philippines and 
fairly influential in Korea. Islam is the main religion of Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia has the largest Moslem population 
in the world. Elsewhere, Hinduism and Buddhism are influential. And across 
the Asian Pacific, the ethic of Confucianism lies in the background.' 
The association between growth and Confucian thinking was a very appeal- 
ing idea in the past decade, when the NIEs and Japan were growing very fast. 
Now,  however, given the remarkable growth records of  many diverse Asian 
countries, one wonders whether Confucianism really is the main driving force. 
Political systems vary as well. Many NIEs were under dictatorships, and 
even now these countries have powerful central governments. In the postsocia- 
list countries, or TEAS, the political systems are often close to dictatorial. The 
state of  human rights in  some countries is criticized by  developed nations. 
Objectively speaking, history seems to show that dictatorship does not neces- 
sarily obstruct rapid economic growth. We  are not advocating dictatorship, of 
course, and we cannot attribute the high growth rates of the Asia-West  Pacific 
area to dictatorial governments. 
History creates important and varying preconditions in  the Asian Pacific 
countries. The Philippines have a history of American colonial influence; the 
South Asian countries, Singapore, and Hong Kong were under British colonial 
rule; and Korea and Taiwan were under Japanese influence. It would be inter- 
esting to study how local ethnic, social, and economic systems have interacted 
with colonial legal and economic infrastructures in these countries. In any dis- 
cussion of the formation of  a free trade area in South Asia, the fact should be 
noted that the South Asian countries formed a single country until the colonial 
control of Great Britain ended (Srinivasan 1994). 
Finally, although most of the Asian Pacific countries now have market econ- 
omies, the degrees of openness of these economies are also diverse. TEA coun- 
tries are by  definition in transition from socialist to market economies. The 
pleasant surprise in Asia is that such transitional economies have been doing 
well on average, and extremely well in some particular cases. In external trade, 
1. Morishima (1982) maintained that the ethic of Confucianism played the same role as that of 
Protestantism did in the development of capitalism. However, his interpretation of Confucianism 
emphasized the hierarchical distinction between superior and subordinate, a view that seems to 
have been somewhat conditioned by his navy experience in Japan and to neglect the various facets 
of Confucianism. In one country the emphasis of Confucianism may be on its liturgical aspects, 
and in another country Confucianism may be regarded simply as a way to be successful in the 
bureaucracy and to justify including family and friends in the government in a manner similar to 
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Source: Hamada (1994). 
Singapore and Hong Kong are free ports, pursuing free trade systems, and both 
have benefited from this orientation. Other countries have some protectionistic 
elements. A tax revenue triangle is presented in figure 4.1. A country's position 
in the triangle indicates the degrees to which the country depends on direct 
taxes, indirect taxes, and trade-related taxes such as tariffs and levies. 
Clearly, it is difficult to single out an explanation for the economic success 
of the Asia-West  Pacific region. At least, however, one may note that all the 
countries of this region border on the Pacific or the Indian Ocean and thus have 
access to transportation by  oceanic routes. For this and other reasons, the de- 
gree of intraregional trade is quite high-as  measured either by the trade inten- 
sity index or by the trade dependency index, defined as the ratio of the sum of 
exports and imports to GNP (for details, see Goto and Hamada 1994, 370, 
374). 
Asian countries have been watching the European Union and NAFIA care- 
fully, and sometimes nervously. As analyzed by Jacob Viner (1950), the estab- 
lishment of  a free trade area or a customs union gives rise to trade creation 
effects within the union but to trade diversion effects outside the union. If  the 
trade diversion effects of the European and North American coalitions are too 
strong, Asian countries worry, the economic vitality of Asia may be consider- 
ably impaired. 
There are at least two movements toward economic integration within Asia. 
One is the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC); another is the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). EAEC is led by  Premier Mahathir of Malay- 
sia. He proposes that the ASEAN countries and East Asian nations such as 95  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan  create an  economic community of  more or less 
strong economic ties. The United States, of course, does not like Asian integra- 
tion from which it is excluded. Japan, which depends heavily on trade with the 
United States, has therefore shown ambivalence toward EAEC. The most re- 
cent news is that Japan will not join the caucus. 
APEC was created in 1989 by U.S. initiative, and perhaps at Japan’s implicit 
suggestion. It is a loose economic integration of the entire Pacific Economic 
Basin-embracing  the United States, Canada, Mexico, and all the Asian and 
West Pacific countries including Australia and New Zealand. In 1994, APEC 
members agreed to realize free trade in the region by 2010 for developed coun- 
tries and by  2020 for developing countries. If  it proceeds, the United States 
will at the same time be a member of NAFIA, a formal free trade area, and a 
member of APEC, a presumably weaker, but nevertheless solid integrated area. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the economic conditions that the Asian 
countries face with the formation of  the European Union and NAFIA. The 
following questions are addressed: Is it desirable for Asia to form its own trad- 
ing area? If desirable, is it better to have a closed union like EAEC or a more 
open union like APEC? In order to analyze these questions, we rely on public 
economics and strategic considerations that clarify the rational incentives na- 
tions have to participate or not participate in economic unions or other forms 
of economic cooperation. 
In sections 4.2 and 4.3 we present two related but different types of models 
of tariffs and trade. In section 4.2, we analyze a model of  symmetric nations 
(or symmetric groups of  nations) that produce differentiated products under 
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. We assume that some 
group of nations is deciding whether to unite into a free trade area and study 
the incentive problem in this group. In section 4.3, we again consider a trade 
model with differentiated products under increasing returns to scale and mo- 
nopolistic competition. We  vary the sizes and the number of  countries, how- 
ever, and show that properties of the Nash equilibrium depend on the number 
of  countries, the relative sizes of  countries, and in particular the relative size 
of the leading country, namely, the hegemon. In any case, the noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium usually differs from the Pareto-optimal configuration. 
In  section 4.4, we use the calculus of  participation to analyze tariff policy 
strategy. In  other words, we ask how a country may  be motivated to join a 
regional agreement or coalition. In section 4.5, we come back to reality and 
in the light of  these theories discuss the incentive structure concerning Asian 
counteractions to regionalism in Europe and North America and concerning 
the formation of EAEC and APEC. 
4.2  Implications of a Symmetric Tariff Bloc Model 
We would like to summarize briefly the results of Goto and Hamada (1993, 
which studies the symmetric world with differentiated products with increas- 
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Suppose there are four symmetric countries or four symmetric groups of 
countries that produce differentiated products with increasing returns, namely, 
with fixed cost. Accordingly, monopolistic competition prevails as the market 
structure. This is a variant of  the new  trade models that have  been  studied 
extensively by  Dixit, Krugman, Lancaster, and many others. For a more de- 
tailed formal model of the analysis in this section, see appendix A of this paper. 
Using the model presented in appendix A, we compare the welfare level of 
each of the four countries in the following three stages in order to understand 
the incentive-theoretic political economy of regional economic integration in 
Asia and the Pacific: 
Stage 1. Before integration 
In this original stage, the four countries engage in trade with each other, 
and all imported products are subject to the same tariff rate t. 
In this second stage, countries 1 and 2 are integrated, and there are no 
tariffs on trade between these two countries. Country 3 and country 4 
are still separated, however. Therefore, trade of countries 3 and 4 with 
the free trade area, as well as trade between country 3 and country 4, 
is subject to the original tariff rate t. 
As will become clearer in the following analysis, country 3 and country 
4 are worse off after the integration of countries 1 and 2, and there is 
an incentive for country 3 and country 4 to form a counterbloc (e.g., 
the Mahathir Plan after EC92 and NAETA in the real world). In  this 
third stage, countries 1 and 2 form one economic bloc, and countries 3 
and 4 form another. Trade within each bloc is subject to no tariff, while 
trade between blocs is subject to the common external tariff (t). 
Stage 2. Initial integration 
Stage 3. Counterintegration (two  polar blocs) 
We  start, after making the simplifying assumption of  constant elasticity of 
demand, with four regions that have not formed any free trade areas and that 
each levy an identical tariff rate on products from outside regions (stage 1).  A 
region is either a country or a group of countries within which trade is free. 
Four regions are trading with each other with levying a constant tariff rate. 
With the simplification  used by Krugman that the elasticity of demand for each 
differentiated product can be regarded as a constant, production decisions are 
predetermined by technology regardless of the value of tariffs. Note that, as do 
Krugman and many others, we assume a large number of differentiated prod- 
ucts (N)  and therefore neglect the second term in the denominator of equation 
(5) in appendix A. Therefore, the number of types of  differentiated products 
and the elasticity of substitution among them are the same before and after the 
integration. In other words, while the model captures a terms-of-trade effect, 
it does not capture a possible positive effect of regional integration resulting 
from more exploitation of increasing returns to scale technology. Trade is bene- 97  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
Table 4.2  Welfare Implication of Regional Integration 
Stage 1  Stage 2 
Before  Initial  Stage 3 
Integration  3  Integration  a  Counterintegration 
1. Terms of  trade 
Countries 1 and 2 
Countries 3 and 4 
Countries 1 and 2 










Source: See Goto and Hamada (1995) for details. 
ficial because it allows the consumption of  a more balanced composition of 
differentiated goods. In future work, we will investigate this issue more thor- 
oughly by  incorporating variable elasticities as well as changes in terms of 
trade. 
The role of tariff rates is thus to give preferential prices to domestic products 
and, after integration, to the products of other countries in the free trade area 
to which a particular country belongs. Consumers prefer consuming as evenly 
as possible both domestic and foreign products. However, because foreign 
products are subject to tariffs, consumers are compelled to consume more do- 
mestic (or within-region) goods than foreign goods. The unevenness in con- 
sumption created by tariff rates is the cost of protection. Conversely, a balanced 
consumption basket of differentiated products is the source of the gains from 
trade. In this setting, suppose two regions unite without changing tariff rates on 
goods from outside the bloc (stage 2). Then each region will give preferential 
treatment to the other region in the tariff bloc. Therefore, the regions in the 
integrated area will gain as a result of trade creation effects. However, those 
regions excluded from the integrated area will suffer as a result of trade diver- 
sion effects. More trade will take place within the integrated area, so that other 
countries will find it more difficult to compete with goods in the united regions. 
We  find that with a given tariff rate, an integration of two countries will never 
fail to have negative effects on the rest-of-world countries left behind. 
The impact of regional integration on welfare levels, based on the formal 
model shown in appendix A, is summarized in table 4.2. While we omit the 
proof, due to space limitations (readers interested in the proof, see Goto and 
Hamada 1995), note that the unambiguous results in table 4.2 do not depend 
on the parameter values of the model. 
Article 24 of the GATT stipulates that countries that are uniting into a cus- 
toms union or free trade area should not raise tariffs. Judging from the results 
described above, however, Article 24 is not good enough as a safeguard against 
the rest-of-world loss generated by a free trade area. 
Thus incentives emerge for the rest of  the world to unite into a customs 98  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
union or free trade area. After this countervailing integration, the symmetric 
structure is restored, with two integrated areas each of which has two regions 
(stage 3). The situation of the rest of the world improves, and the situation of 
the  first free trade area deteriorates from the position its members obtained 
when the other countries were not integrated. This will be an incentive,  and 
possibly a justification, for the Asian countries to integrate to form their own 
free trade area. 
Needless to say, when the four countries form a single union  (i.e., when 
totally free trade prevails in the world), the welfare level of  each country is 
higher than under stage 3. For this reason, we cannot conclude from the above 
analysis that it is optimal for the Asian countries to form their own countervail- 
ing trading bloc. Instead, the above analysis merely suggests that the welfare 
of the Asian countries is higher when they form a countervailing free trade 
area than when they are left out of existing trading blocs. Since the analysis 
based on the model predicts that the welfare of  the Asian countries will in- 
crease even more if they are united with the Western Hemisphere, as well as 
with each other, APEC, which includes countries on both sides of the Pacific 
as its members, seems to be a promising option. 
4.3  Optimal Tariffs and the Relative Size of Regions 
In the  above model, the regions are identical in size, and tariff  rates are 
constant. Of course, the relative size of the free trade area will affect the moti- 
vations of regions to join an integration. Also, regions normally choose the 
most desirable tariff rates, which also depend on the relative size of a tariff- 
imposing region. 
This is not the place to develop all the mathematics of optimal tariffs and 
retaliation processes, but in order to give the reader an idea of what is involved 
we sketch the results obtained by Gros (1987) and interpreted by  Krugman 
(1991). The question is, what is the optimal tariff structure in the world where 
differentiated goods are produced under increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition? In other words, what is the reaction curve of a region given other 
regions’ tariff rates? This question was solved by Gros, and then a simplified 
derivation was developed by  Krugman in such a way  as to be applied to eco- 
nomic integration. Krugman (1991) and Stein (1994) considered the effect of 
dividing the whole world into various blocs of equal sizes and asked what the 
optimal number of  symmetric blocs was. In this section, we instead consider 
the world where the relative sizes of bloc are variable and ask what the incen- 
tives are for each country or region to create or join a bloc. We believe that 
this approach is at least complementary to and more realistic  than hgman 
and Stein’s. 
Consider the case in which the world is divided into two blocs of different 
sizes. We can derive a formula for the optimal tariff rate of bloc I with respect 
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is nonzero even if the country is infinitesimally small. This reflects the product 
differentiation and monopolistic competition assumed in the new trade model. 
On the other hand, the optimal tariff is a decreasing function of the tariff 
rate of the trading partner and an increasing function of the relative size of the 
home country. In order to understand the effect of monopolistic or monopso- 
nistic power on tariff-setting behaviors of countries that differ in size, a formal 
model is presented in appendix B. To make the point as clear as possible, ap- 
pendix B presents a Ricardian model of trade; however, readers familiar with 
trade theory will easily understand that properties similar to those obtained in 
the appendix  will hold for the  Heckscher-Ohlin  model with variable  factor 
proportions.  It can be shown that similar conclusions can be extended to a 
model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. 
In our model with a large country (a hegemon) and a small country (or coun- 
tries) summarized in appendix B, the implication of the sizes of countries is 
obvious. In short, in international trade with tariffs as policy instruments, the 
hegemon has the capability to manipulate the terms of trade to its advantage. 
Therefore, it is optimal for a larger bloc to impose a higher tariff rate. Thus, if 
two blocs engage in a tariff war, the larger bloc gains more by imposing a high 
tariff. The great exploits the small! 
One can extend this analysis to the case of a many-country  world where a 
large group of countries will find it more profitable to impose a higher tariff 
rate. If  economic integration proceeds,  there is an incentive  for a group of 
nations like the European Union or NAFTA to impose a higher rate of tariff. 
Article 24 of  the GATT would work against this. The article is a safeguard 
agreement to prevent  such monopolistic behavior. Our results in section 4.2 
indicate, however, that simply keeping  the original tariff  rate could still be 
harmful for the rest of the world. 
Consider a situation in which a large country and many small countries im- 
pose a minimum level of tariff, but the large country can choose to react in 
such a way that it becomes the Stackelberg leader. This country would create 
a larger and larger free trade area. The larger group will find it more profitable 
to impose an optimal tariff. Article 24 of  the GATT prohibits this, but the 
analysis of the last section shows that in spite of this GATT provision it would 
be profitable for countries to unite. Of course, this process cannot go all the 
way. If there are hardly any other countries remaining in the rest of the world, 
the optimal tariff may not yield any gain because there is hardly anyone left 
to exploit. So, at some point, the process should stop. In such a world, where 
all nations are united  except, say, Monaco, there is nothing to exploit from 
Monaco, whatever optimal tariff the bloc members charge. 
4.4  The Calculus of Participation 
We would like to apply the calculus of participation to the formation of free 
trade areas. The calculus of participation, sometimes called the theory of clubs, 100  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
regards the decision of a nation as a rational decision among various alterna- 
tives  and  subject to  various  constraints.  Nations  are  supposed to  decide 
whether to join a coalition or group by calculating the national costs and bene- 
fits of joining the coalition or group. 
The incentive problem of forming or joining an economic union can be ana- 
lyzed from the standpoint of the calculus of participation. Olson (1965) devel- 
oped an analysis of collective action, but the analysis is of limited significance 
in the study of economic integration because it assumes a predetermined mem- 
bership. Buchanan (1964) developed an economic theory of clubs that allows 
for variable size of membership. Although his analysis was directed mainly at 
the problem of efficiency rather than the political structure of conflict, it pro- 
vides a useful tool for analyzing collective action with variable members. 
As indicated in Hamada (1985), international economic relations can be 
characterized as a two-stage game. The first stage requires players to agree on 
a system or rule, and the second involves the interplay of  economic policies 
under a given rule. The second stage is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma; 
the first to the battle of the sexes. 
Recently, in the theory of participation, the tools of public economics have 
been applied to political science, providing the theoretical basis for associating 
group behavior with individual rationality.2 
The rational theory of participation (see, e.g., Riker and Ordeshook 1973, 
chap. 3) indicates that an individual decision unit decides to participate in a 
collective action if the anticipated benefit is larger than the cost. The rational 
decision for a country contemplating membership in an economic union is to 
join if the benefits from participation are larger than the costs. 
When the benefits of collective action exhibit a public-good character, how- 
ever, the amount of  collective action may  be less than optimal, where opti- 
mality is judged by  the Paretian standard. Olson showed this by  applying the 
theory of public goods to collective action (Olson 1965). Suppose there is a 
single public  good  whose  benefits  are  commonly shared by  participating 
agents. The rational decision by  an individual agent is to equate the marginal 
private benefit from the public good to the marginal cost of supplying a unit of 
the public good. However, the optimal outcome from the point of view of soci- 
ety as a whole is to equate the marginal cost to the social benefit, which is the 
sum of the individual benefits. Thus, the supply of the public good may be less 
than optimal because the individual decision unit does not take account of the 
external effect on other decision units. Therefore, even when a consensus ex- 
ists concerning the objective of a collective action, the amount produced may 
be too small. The interesting testable hypothesis about group behavior is that 
the behavior of  a large group will be different from that of  a small group; a 
2. The application of tools developed in economics to politics requires caution, but recent devel- 
opments in political science have shown that the application of  economic analysis can clarify the 
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shortfall in supply is more likely the larger the group because the free-rider 
problem intrinsic in the supply of public goods without the possibility of exclu- 
sion will be more acute if each member shares in the common benefit to only 
a small degree. A second hypothesis is that the decision unit that receives a 
relatively large proportion of the benefit of public goods will be likely to bear 
more than a proportional share of the cost. In other words, if each participant 
behaves rationally according to the private benefit-cost calculation, a small de- 
cision unit can exploit a large one. 
The same argument can be applied to the analysis of public “bads” as well. 
If costs are incurred in preventing the generation of public bads, then there is 
a tendency to overproduce public bads, inasmuch as the marginal social harm 
of public bads is larger than their marginal private harm. 
Olson’s theory of collective action, interesting as it is, is subject to several 
criticisms. First, as pointed out by Wagner (1966) and developed in more detail 
by  Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young (1971), the theory of collective action 
neglects the role of political entrepreneurship or leadership in integrating the 
individual benefits from a collective action. If an agent with political entrepre- 
neurship can persuade the group of  the effectiveness of  collective action in 
spite of the apparent excess of individual cost over individual benefit, then the 
proper amount of collective goods may be supplied, with some leadership sur- 
plus being left over for that agent. 
Second, the analysis assumes passive behavior on the part of each participant 
and  accordingly neglects the  leader-follower relationship  analyzed in  von 
Stackelberg (1934). If a participant picks the most profitable point on the oppo- 
nent’s reaction curve, then he behaves as a leader and can enjoy the leadership 
or exploitation solution. (To avoid complication arising from the two uses of 
the word leadership, this case will be called exploitation, while leadership in 
the  sense  of  political  entrepreneurship will  be  called  political  entrepre- 
neurship.) 
An  economic theory of  clubs with variable group size and with possible 
exclusion of nonmembers from enjoyment of collective goods was developed 
by Buchanan (1964). According to his analysis, collective goods are supplied 
optimally provided appropriate charges are imposed on the use of the service 
and provided the services of the collective goods can be exclusively supplied 
to members of the group. This approach has more relevance to monetary inte- 
gration since the benefits of integration are public in that their enjoyment by a 
particular member does not diminish the enjoyment of others but at the same 
time most of the benefits are enjoyed almost exclusively by the countries partic- 
ipating in the monetary union. In short, there exists nonrivalry in the consump- 
tion of  the services of a monetary union but not nonexclusiveness. 
The decision of countries considering whether to participate in an  economic 
union is based on a comparison of the gains from joining the union with the 
costs. The resulting implication is straightforward: if there are externalities in 
increasing the size of membership, an individual nation’s participation decision 102  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
based on a rational calculation may lead to a smaller than optimal economic 
union even if the country is fully aware of the costs and benefits. The problem 
is that an individual nation’s decision is based on a private benefit-cost calcula- 
tion, while the public benefit to the group as a whole includes the gains to the 
countries that are already in the union. 
In the case of a free trade area, a nation decides whether to form a free trade 
area (or to join an existing one) by  comparing the benefits with the costs. In 
the tariff case, however, the common tariff is the public good. In other words, 
the joint consumption good is the optimal tariff for the coalition to impose on 
the rest of the world. What are the costs to coalition members? There can be 
costs on the political dimension, which we will go into later, but aside from 
these, the sacrifice is not so great because small countries cannot effectively re- 
taliate. 
Therefore, the common tariff will be the optimal tariff from the point of 
view of the union. The result would be that each country in the union would 
like to extend the free trade area up to the point at which the rest of the world 
cannot be exploited further. 
On the other hand, if the tariff is restricted by Article 24 of the GATT, the 
dominating union cannot reach its optimal size but must stop somewhere be- 
fore that point. Thus, by limiting tariff strategy, GATT Article 24 keeps coun- 
tries from creating extraordinarily large free trade areas. 
So far, we  have  been concerned with the situation in which the national 
interest is united. But it is sometimes difficult to agree on “the national inter- 
est.” And there is a need to consider the effect of domestic conflicts and sec- 
toral opposition to the formation of a free trade area. During the NAFTA nego- 
tiations, for example, labor unions in the United States opposed the creation 
of  a free trade area. In developing countries, many  sectors oppose joining a 
free trade area because import-competing industries fear loss of profit due to 
foreign competition without tariff protection. Therefore, even in a world in 
which a country can impose the optimal tariff for national advantage, there will 
still be opposition to a free trade area from labor unions and various sectors. 
When a nation cannot choose the optimal tariff, there will be more problems 
for any movement against the formation of a free trade area. Such an area may 
obstruct international trade, but at the same time it will block the formation of 
a large free trade area that will exploit the rest of the world by  its monopolistic 
power. These discussions are related to the hegemonic stability theory, a favor- 
ite topic of political scientists. The incentives of small countries and the incen- 
tives of a hegemon can be analyzed from this point of view. The solution differs 
greatly between the case in which monopolistic power of trade is concerned 
and the case in which the creation of common public goods is involved. In the 
former case of private goods, the large exploits the small; in the case of public 
goods, the small exploits the large. 
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process of coalition formation among countries. We understand the effect on a 
particular country of integrating several countries (or regions). We do not fully 
understand why a group of  nations emerges as an economic union and how 
the process of integration evolves. N-person game theory gives only a partial 
explanation. In order to answer these questions, we probably need a multidi- 
mensional approach incorporating geography and military relations, in addi- 
tion to economic factors. 
4.5  The Future of the Asian Community 
From these discussions the following observations about the Asian situa- 
tion emerge. 
First, EAEC, under the leadership of Malaysia, can be considered a natural 
response by the Asian countries to the two big blocs in the world, the European 
Union and NAFTA. It is also natural that Americans would not like this move 
because the formation of  an exclusive economic bloc in Asia would have a 
negative economic impact on non-Asian countries. But we do not exactly un- 
derstand why many Americans show such an emotional attitude toward the 
EAEC proposal, claiming that it is racist, anti-Caucasian, and economically 
vague. Premier Mahathir addressed a letter to the readers of the Yomiuri, the 
largest newspaper in Japan, asking why Americans have allowed Europeans to 
create a common market but have opposed such a measure in Asia. The authors 
found this argument quite persuasive. 
Second, it is natural for the United States to promote opposing coalitions 
like APEC to nullify the possible economic impact of EAEC. APEC is sup- 
ported by Japan as well. At the moment Japan is leaning away from joining 
EAEC. The Japanese economy is interwoven very closely by way of trade and 
foreign investment with the U.S. economy. Thus, even though in recent years 
Japan’s trade with Asia has surpassed its trade with the United States, the trade 
tie between Japan and the United States is strong. Therefore, although some 
Japanese wish to go “out of the West to Asia”-in  contrast to the motto of the 
Meiji Restoration period, “out of Asia to the West”-Japan  is obliged to re- 
main neutral. Because of this Japanese ambivalence and persistent American 
meddlesomeness the world over, APEC is expected to turn the vast Asian Pa- 
cific region into an enormous economic community with yet to be specified 
(probably loose) economic integration. 
This attitude (opposition to EAEC) of the United States gives us an impres- 
sion of a declining hegemon. In more objective terms, however, we should also 
note that APEC has a different structure than NAFTA or the European Union. 
The United States belongs to NAFTA and at the same time intends to place 
itself under the same umbrella as all the Asian Pacific countries. It gives the 
set of  integrations throughout the world a rhizome rather than a tree structure, 
so to speak. Therefore, if we may take an optimistic view, through the United 104  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
States the tightness of  the NAFTA  trade bloc may  be broken as by  a wind 
vent, and there may be some possibility of creating a superimposed regional 
integration of North America and the Pacific. 
Thus, compared with the situation in which Asia creates an  independent 
trading bloc and counteracts the European Union and NAFTA, American ac- 
quisitiveness and the loose structure of APEC may yield a result that is benefi- 
cial to both the American and the Pacific  region^.^ Perhaps APEC is a way 
toward international free trade. 
Appendix A 
A Symmetric TarifS Bloc Model 
This appendix briefly summarizes the symmetric tariff bloc model of Goto and 
Hamada (  1995).4 
In the model, consumers of a representative country k (k = 1,2,3,4)  possess 
the following individualistic social utility function (U,): 
where C,, is the amount of  consumption of  the ith differentiated product in 
country k and N is the number of types of differentiated products available to 
consumers. Consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint 
where 4 is the domestic price (i.e., tariff-inclusive price) of the ith differenti- 
ated product in country k and Yk  is the national income of country k. 
From the above utility maximization problem, we obtain the following in- 




Zk = I: cg,. 
I=  I 
3. This is a natural conclusion of our analysis in section 4.2. Namely, in a world of four countries 
(or regions), the welfare level of each country is higher when all four countries unite into a single 
union than when there are two polar blocs. 
4. While the basic model developed in Goto and Hamada (1995) can incorporate any number 
of countries, differences in country size, and, to some extent, asymmetric tariffs, the model in this 
appendix is a simplified version that assumes four identical countries and symmetric tariffs. 105  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
From equation (3) the elasticity of demand for the ith differentiated product 
(El,) is 
~-  1 
&.  = _____ 
Ik 
(1 -  p> + pcP,/z,' 
If  we assume large N  and the  symmetry of  each differentiated  product,  as 
Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Norman (1980) did, we can simplify the prob- 
lem; for example, equation (5)  reduces to the following: 
(5') 
Note that we now omit the subscripts i and k for E because the demand elastic- 
ity of the products turns out to be the same for all products due to the symme- 
try assumption. 
The producer of the ith differentiated product in country k is characterized 
by the following cost function: 
& = 1 /(1 -  p). 
TC,, = W,F + W,m  cC,J ,  (6)  c,  1 
where TC,, and  are the total cost of the ith producer and the wage rate in 
country k, respectively; m is the labor input requirement per unit of output, 
while F is a fixed amount of factor input necessary for any positive amount of 
production. The producer maximizes the following profit function: 
(7) 
where nr  is the profit of the ith producer and t] is the tariff rate imposed by 
country j on the imported differentiated product. Note that due to the assump- 
tion of a symmetric tariff, tJ is the same for all j,  except for the case ofj  = k. 
Needless to say, there  are no tariffs  imposed  on domestic  goods. From the 
profit maximization problem, we obtain the following profit maximizing price 
for the ith producer in country k, as shown in equation (8). Note that without 
loss of generality, country k is assumed to produce the first nk  types of differen- 
tiated products. 
(8) 
Further, we assume free entry and free exit. Therefore, the profit of each ex- 
isting firm is forced to zero. Hence, equation (9) holds in equilibrium: 
(/  = Ym(1 + tJp. 
The demand for labor by the ith producer (1J is obtained: 
(10) 
4 
I! = F  -+  m  CU. 
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The domestic labor supply is assumed to be constant; that is, there is no 
wage-leisure trade-off. Therefore, the sum of labor input in all firms in country 
k is equal to the amount of the domestic labor supply in that country (L): 
(11) 
where n, is the number of firms in country k. 
The tariff revenue accrued to the government is assumed to be distributed to 
domestic consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Since there is no profit in equilib- 
rium, national income consists of factor payment and tariff revenue. 
“k 
D,  = L, 
i=l 
where tk  is the tariff rate imposed by country k on its imports. 
The above model is complete, and the above specification gives equilibrium 
conditions for a representative country k. We can solve the model, once the 
values of the parameters (m,  F, f3, tk,  L)  are identified. 
Using the above model, we compared the welfare level of the three stages 
discussed in the main text, (1)  before integration, (2) initial integration, and (3) 
counterintegration. While we omit the proof, due to space limitations (readers 
who are interested in the proof, see Goto and Hamada 1993,  using the above 
model, we can rigorously demonstrate the pattern of welfare change shown in 
table 4.2. 
Appendix B 
The Size of  Countries in a Model of Tanfs 
Let us start from a two-country situation of the Ricardian model where labor 
is the only factor of  production. To  produce two goods  1 and 2, the larger 
country (hegemon) has input coefficients a,, a*, and the smaller country has 
input coefficients a:,  a;.  The larger country has a comparative advantage in 
producing good 1 so that a,/a, <  a:/a;.  The two countries have labor endow- 
ment L and L*, and the larger country is large enough to warrant max(L/a,,  L/ 
a,)  >  max(L*/a:,  L*/a;). The utility function of a representative consumer is 
expressed as a function of per capita consumption c,, c2,  and cf,  c;  as U(c,, 
c2)  and Cr(cT,  c;). Both governments are assumed to conduct their tariff poli- 
cies in such a way as to maximize the utility of the representative consumer. 
Then the offer curves are drawn as in the figures. Figure 4B. 1 indicates the 
case where the hegemon is so large that the smaller country’s offer curve inter- 
sects with that of the hegemon on the straight line (with slope a,/a,) through 
the origin. Then the smaller country satisfies the definition of a “small country” 107  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
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Fig. 4B.1  Offer curves of hegemon and small country 
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Fig. 4B.2  Size of small country and gains to hegemon 
and thus cannot take advantage of the elasticity of the hegemon. The hegemon 
can impose an optimal tariff to exploit its monopolistic power in exports, or 
monopsonistic power in imports, in such a way to make its trade indifference 
curve tangent to the offer curve of the smaller country, that is, at T. 
If  the size of  the smaller country is very small, the gain in terms of trade 
does not bring substantial welfare gain because the amount of trade is limited 
(see point S in fig. 4B.2). Unless the smaller country is capable of exercising 
its monopolistic (monopsonistic) power, the gain from the tariff is larger if the 
smaller country occupies some space in the world economy (see point M). 
Now we can relax our two-country assumption. Suppose there are one hege- 
mon and n smaller countries. Figure 4B.3 illustrates the case with n = 2.  Since 108  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
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Fig. 4B.4  Reaction curves of hegemon and small country 
there is no incentive for smaller countries to become Stackelberg leaders as 
long as they cannot change the terms of  trade offered by  the hegemon, the 
same point M will be enjoyed by  the hegemon, and the smaller countries are 
both left at point S. 
We  can depict the strategic situation by  reaction curves in the space of the 
tariff rate of  the hegemon t and that of  the smaller country (or countries) t* 
(fig.  4B.4). In this Ricardian situation the reaction curve of the smaller country 
(or countries) coincides with the horizontal axis. The reaction curve of  the 
hegemon starts with the optimal tariff f in the absence of retaliation upward. 
Therefore the Nash solution N is the combination (f, 0), which coincides with 109  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
the Stackelberg solution with the hegemon as the leader. The smaller country 
(or countries) does not have any incentive to be a leader. 
We all know that when the two (or more than two) countries are of similar 
size, then more complex situations emerge in which a tariff imposed by  one 
country triggers retaliation by the other, and in which each country strives to 
be a Stackelberg leader. 
In our model with a hegemon and a small country (or small countries), the 
implication of  the  sizes of countries is obvious. In short, in trade of  goods 
situation with tariffs as instruments, the hegemon has the capability to manipu- 
late the terms of  trade to its advantage. In the Heckscher-Ohlin  model with 
variable  factor proportion,  there is no longer  a linear  segment in the  offer 
curve. However, since the large country has an almost linear segment, our re- 
sults will apply without significant modification. 
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Comment  Tamim Bayoumi 
This paper deals with the important issue of how Asian countries should re- 
spond to the formation of  large free trade zones in Europe (the European 
Union) and North America (NAFTA). As the title suggests, the approach taken 
is to look at the incentives of the various participants, and to use this to analyze 
the optimal Asian response to these initiatives. 
The workhorse of the paper is the model of trade with increasing returns to 
scale. Some intellectual history may be useful. In an extremely elegant paper, 
Krugman (1991a) analyzed the implications of free trade areas by loolung at 
how welfare changed as the world was divided into symmetric free trade zones. 
He found that the lowest level of  welfare occurred when  there were three 
zones, essentially because as the free trade zones became larger they gained 
more market power, and hence the optimal tariff that they  were assumed to 
charge rose. The trade-diverting impact of these higher tariffs with the rest of 
the world generally dominated the trade-creating impact of lower tariffs within 
the free trade zones themselves, leading to lower welfare. 
Goto and Hamada use the same basic model, but rather than looking at the 
impact of symmetric trade zones, they look at the implications of asymmetric 
behavior. In particular, they consider the impact on the rest of  the world if  a 
specific group of countries forms a free trade area. They find that the formation 
of the free trade area lowers welfare for the rest of the world even if the coun- 
tries within the free trade area maintain their current level of tariffs, rather than 
exploiting their increased market power to raise external tariffs. In short, the 
very existence of  the free trade area causes trade diversion, even if  external 
tariffs remain unchanged. If  they do raise tariffs, as the optimum tariff argu- 
ment would imply, then the costs would certainly be higher, as is discussed in 
a following section of the paper. 
I will limit my comments to two issues. The first has to do with a subsidiary 
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result that Krugman also derived. Having shown in the first paper that three 
free trade blocs was the worst possible solution, he wrote another paper in 
which it was the best  solution (Krugman  199lb)-thereby  setting up what 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1993) characterized as the Krugman versus Krugman 
debate. The crucial difference is that in the second paper there were assumed 
to be three continents, and while the costs of transportation  are low within 
these continents they are high between them. As a result, there is relatively 
little trade between continents, and hence forming free trade areas within the 
continents generates relatively little trade diversion. In this case, the benefits 
from the trade creation within a continent outweigh the losses from trade diver- 
sion with the rest of the world. 
Even in this world, the experiment of Goto and Hamada in which one conti- 
nent forms a free trade area and the other one does not would still generate a 
fall in welfare. However, the fall in welfare would be relatively small as there 
is not much trade to be diverted. A crucial factor in discussing the marginal 
impact of forming a free trade bloc on existing welfare is therefore intrabloc 
trade. Table 4C. 1 shows some data on this. It measures the percentage of output 
in  1992 exported to other potential trade blocs for three broadly comparable 
countries, Korea, Canada, and France. Korea exports 6.6 percent of its output 
to North America (defined as the United States and Canada) and 3.2 percent 
to the European  Union.  By contrast, France sends  1.5 percent  of  its output 
to Asia (broadly defined to include Australia, New Zealand, and the Indian 
subcontinent) or to North America. Finally, Canada sends around 2 percent of 
its output to both Asia and the European Union.' 
1. While these are three specific economies, I am reasonably sure that the results are relatively 
general. See Sterne and Bayoumi (1993) for a more general analysis of intra- and interbloc trade 
in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Table 4C.2  Correlations of Supply Disturbances across Different Geographic Regions 
A. Western Europe 

















0.54  0.36  1.00 
0.62  0.56  1.00 
0.68  0.54  0.56  0.37  1.00 
~ 0.41  0.28  0.38  0.47  0.49  1.00 
0.38  0.25  0.58  0.47  0.36  0.39 
0.21  0.28  0.39  -  -= 0.15  0.06 
0.12  0.12  0.13  0.12  -0.05  -0.25 
0.33  0.21  0.17  0.23  0.22  0.25 
0.21  0.33  0.11  !l&J  -0.04  -0.03 
-0.00  -0.21  0.11  -0.02  -0.32  0.08 
0.31  0.30  0.43  0.06  0.35  0.01 
-0.27  -0.11  -0.39  -0.26  -0.37  -0.21 
0.22  0.12  -0.25  0.06  0.30  0.11 
0.52  1.00 
~  ~ 
~~~  ~ 
1  .00 
0.16  0.28  1.00 
0.07  0.20  0.01  1.00 
0.13  0.22  0.27  0.51  1.00 
0.08  0.14  0.05  -0.15  0.01  1.00 
0.44  0.46  0.41  0.20  0.39  0.10  1.00 
0.06  -0.32  -0.04  0.07  -0.13  -0.23  -0.10  -0.08  1.00 
-0.04  1.00 
~~ 
-0.18  0.01  0.27  -0.09  0.26  0.08  0.10  1.00 
B.  East Asia 
Jap  Tai  Kor  Tha  HK  Sin  Ma1  Ind  Phi  Aul  NZ 
Japan  I .00 
Korea  0.46  0.54  1.00 
Taiwan  0.61  1.00 
Thailand  0.32  0.59  0.36  1.00 
~ Hong Kong  0.29  0.28  0.05  0.31  1.00 
Singapore  -0.10  0.25  0.02  0.29  0.63  1.00 
Malaysia 
Indonesia  0.14  -0.03  -0.10  0.13  0.53  0.55  0.52  1.00 
Philippines  0.10  0.37  -0.11  -0.06  0.05  0.05  -0.03  0.03  1.00 
Australia  0.12  0.21  0.19  0.14-0.16-0.22  0.030.09  0.23  1.00 
New Zealand  0.01  0.19  -0.25  0.15  -0.12  0.13  -0.11  0.01  -0.06  -0.41  1.00 
-0.02  0.06  -0.03  0.35  0.47  0.71  1.00  __- 
C.  The Americas 
US  Can  Mex  Col  Ven  Ecu  Per  Bra  Bol  Par  UN  Arg  Chi 
United States  1  .00 
Canada  -0.47  1.00 
Mexico  -0.59  0.35  1.00 
Colombia  -0.02  0.05  0.25  1.00 
Venezuela  0.09  0.34  -0.42  0.15  1.00 
Ecuador  -0.02  0.37  0.27  0.20  0.36  1.00 
Peru  -0.40  0.05  0.37  0.07  0.10  0.28  1.00 
Brazil  0.24  0.13  -0.08  0.07  0.13  0.40  0.38  1.00 
Bolivia  -0.65  0.72  0.65  0.18  0.00  0.29  0.54  0.17  1.00 
Paraguay  -0.34  0.45  0.37  0.06  0.12  -0.07  0.16  0.22  0.39  1.00 
Uruguay  0.27  -0.31  -0.26  -0.35  0.05  -0.21  0.01  -0.06  -0.20  -0.08  1.00 
Argentina  -0.30  0.08  -0.18  0.10  0.27  -0.01  0.36  0.34  0.06  0.06  -0.48  1.00 
Chile  -0.18  0.03  0.23  0.09  -0.33  -0.41  0.19  -0.23  0.17  0.21  -0.33  0.21  1.00 
Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). 
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An important asymmetry between the three regions of the world, therefore, 
appears to be in their patterns of trade. Asia is heavily dependent on trade with 
North America (and, to a lesser extent, with Europe) in a way that none of the 
other blocs are with each other. Clearly, Asia has considerably more to  lose 
from trade diversion  than the other two blocs, but the opposite is much less 
true. This explains the relative indifference in Europe and North America about 
moves  to  greater  regional  integration  in  Asia,  compared  with  the  concern 
within Asia about the European Union and NAFTA. Because North Americans 
and Europeans do not trade much outside of their own blocs, trade diversion 
is simply not a big issue. 
Given this fact, I would be wary about the conclusions reached in the paper 
that it would  benefit Asia  to form its own  free trade bloc  in opposition  to 
NAFTA and the European Union. Asia clearly has most to lose from the poten- 
tial regionalization of trade, and resulting trade diversion, that such a strategy 
might generate. As it is best to include all of one’s major trading partners within 
one free trade area in order to minimize the potential for welfare losses from 
trade diversion,  I would have thought that APEC is currently a more logical 
regional choice for Asian nations. Of course, if Asia carries on growing at the 
very fast pace we have seen recently, intraregional trade is likely to continue 
to grow faster than trade with the rest of the world. However, given the very 
heavy dependence of many Asian nations on the North American market cur- 
rently, I would be surprised if  intra-Asian trade became sufficiently regional 
over the next few years to change the analysis significantly. 
My second point has to do with one of the building blocks of the analysis, 
namely, the optimal tariff argument. Optimal tariffs have excellent theoretical 
credentials, but I find it very difficult to relate them to the world around me. 
They imply that large and important countries should have higher tariffs than 
small ones. Yet both Britain before 1914 and the United States since 1945 have 
been  champions of  free trade. Indeed, the very existence of a relatively  free 
trading system seems to me to be a refutation of the importance of the optimal 
tariff argument. If large countries really were thirsting to raise tariffs against 
the rest of  the world, then  I very much doubt that Article 24 of the GATT 
would have stopped them. Rather, it appears generally to be smaller and less 
developed countries that have traditionally had high tariffs and many import 
restrictions, and the rich and large countries that have tried to prize markets 
open-sometimes  irresponsibly, as the opium wars of the nineteenth century 
between Britain and China amply illustrate. 
Why is there such a difference between theory and observation? The optimal 
tariff argument deals largely with the gains to consumption from trade. As the 
tariff rises, the terms of trade of the country improve, and consumers benefit. 
But another element in trade is that it opens producers to international competi- 
tion. Successful countries are generally happy to face such competition as they 
believe that their products will be preferred. By contrast, many small countries 
believe that they have to protect their industries from foreign competitors in 115  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
order to stimulate domestic development. This, I believe, is the reason that the 
optimal tariff argument appears to fail in practice. 
Finally, a word about long-term prospects for regional cooperation in Asia 
when its trade dependence on North America has diminished. The theory of 
optimum currency areas tells us that countries are most likely to form a cur- 
rency union if their underlying disturbances are relatively similar, as in these 
circumstances the cost of losing the ability to run an independent monetary 
policy is smaller. A similar argument could be made that a free trade zone is 
easier to maintain if underlying disturbances are similar, as the likely cost of 
not being able to use tariff policy is lower. Such an argument would certainly 
fit the European Union. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) analyzed the corre- 
lations of underlying disturbances across Europe, the Americas, and East Asia, 
reproduced as table 4C.2. Significant positive correlations are underlined. As 
one can see, there are few significant correlations in the Americas, but at least 
two groups of countries with highly correlated disturbances in East Asia. This 
suggests that in the long run, regional cooperation  in Asia may prove to be 
more successful than such moves in the Americas. 
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Comment  Wontack Hong 
It is difficult to agree on “the national interest.” It is, however, more difficult 
to agree on the precise definition of “free trade (area).” Nonhegemonic  small 
countries may be more concerned about the content of free trade than estab- 
lishing a free trade area itself. 
Wontack Hong is professor of economics at Seoul University. 116  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
It is argued that since tariff strategy is restricted by GATT Article 24, coun- 
tries may not be able to reach the optimal “size” of dominating union. How- 
ever, since an optimal tariff  has to include  tariff-equivalent gray measures, 
GATT Article 24 itself may not be a real constraint on the size of a free trade 
area. Perhaps the optimal size of the party (country group) to be exploited may 
be the only principal constraint on the  size of a dominating union (see the 
Monaco story). The optimum size of a free trade “gang” that is to exploit ex- 
cluded outsiders [by imposing a higher tariff rate) has to be clearly defined. 
The “emotional” attitude of Americans accusing the EAEC proposal of be- 
ing racial or anti-Caucasian  is criticized. The authors, however, use equally 
emotional expressions, such as “greedy” or “acquisitive.” 
There seems to be a gap or jump between what the Goto-Hamada model 
says and what the authors say about the real world. One can deduce from their 
model something like the following: (1)  the larger a block, the higher the opti- 
mal tariff can be, and (2)  there are incentives in establishing a countervailing 
free trade area to make two polar blocs. In analyzing the real world, however, 
they address the problem of whether it is better to create a countervailing block 
against the European Union  and NAFTA, such as the East Asian Economic 
Caucus [EAEC), or to promote APEC [including EAEC and NAFTA within 
the  block)  against  the  European  Union.  Furthermore,  such  statements  as 
“APEC might be better than EAEC if APEC can loosen the tightness of the 
NAFTA bloc” cannot be inferred from their model. 
In  many  cases,  for  nonhegemonic  small  countries,  the  question  is  not 
whether to participate in an economic union, but how to say yes and mean 
no or how to sabotage coercion by a hegemonic country seeking leadership 
exploitation. One may argue that as far as nonhegemonic small countries are 
concerned, the worst possible multilateral solution (or free trade arrangement) 
would still be better than the best possible bilateral solution with a dominating 
country such as the United States. That is, the larger the scope of multilater- 
alism (in terms of the number of countries involved), the less may be the ex- 
ploitation by the leader country in any free trade arrangement. The smaller the 
number of  countries included in a union,  the greater may be the danger of 
exploitation by a (local) hegemonic country 
To  nonhegemonic  small countries, the World Trade Organization  (WTO) 
arrangement might be the best possible one they can expect at this point in 
time. While pushing the WTO, the European Community established the Euro- 
pean Union and the United States established NAFTA, apparently in order to 
make the WTO system less effective and to impose the so-called optimal tariff. 
It is very natural for Japan to push the countervailing EAEC through Mahathir 
(say, by telepathy) and also very natural for the United States to try to abort 
this hidden  Japanese effort by having opposing coalitions like APEC. Since 
Japan (“at the moment”) still cannot say no to the United States, it can only 
hope for the realization of the “optimistic view” described by  Goto and Ha- 
mada (i.e., through the acquisitive attitude of the United States the tightness of 117  EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses 
the NAFTA bloc may be broken while making APEC a loose integration). For 
other  small economies  in East Asia, the nightmarish  situation is to decide 
whether to join EAEC or NAFTA in a final showdown (i.e., picking the lesser 
of the two evils). One solution for them might be the proper functioning of the 
WTO, and the alternative might be the proper functioning of APEC against the 
European  Union, including both the United States and Japan in this Pacific 
union  and hoping that such an APEC is a way  to realize a truly free trading 
world under WTO. I wish Goto and Hamada would modify their model so as 
to amplify the aspects pointed out here-for  example, the larger the number 
of countries involved in a free trade negotiation, the less might be the exploita- 
tion by the leader country, This Page Intentionally Left Blank